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Abstract: This study measures the retail and wholesale price effects in Louisville, Kentucky
resulting from the Marathon/Ashland (MAP) joint venture. MAP was an early transaction in the
recent era of petroleum mergers and it caused sizeable changes in concentration. We find no
evidence of increased retail prices resulting from MAP. Wholesale (rack) prices increased
significantly approximately 15 months following the transaction. This wholesale price (rack)
increase, however, was probably caused by a regional supply shock rather than the transaction.
These results suggest in this case that a significant petroleum merger in a moderately
concentrated market did not raise consumer prices.
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2“I urge Congress to enact a moratorium of at least one year on any merger or acquisitions of
any major oil refiner, supplier or retailer, including cross-sector mergers and acquisitions, while
Congress, the FTC and the states work together to fashion a longer term remedy that helps
restore competitive forces and tempers the market dominance wielded by the few industry
giants.”  Testimony of Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal Before the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, May 2, 2002.
     
3ExxonMobil Corporation, Investor and Media Meeting, New York, Aug. 1, 2000, pp. 36-37.
     
4 There have been attempts to indirectly look at merger effects by examining changes in
concentration. (GAO, 1986) Simply using concentration as a proxy for merger effects is
problematic on a number of theoretical and practical levels, e.g. the difficulty of defining markets
correctly and controlling for endogenous market structure. (Evans et al., 1993)
     
5The most commonly examined wholesale price for gasoline is the rack price. The rack price
is the price posted at the truck rack at a terminal for trucks loading branded or unbranded
gasoline. The percentage of wholesale transactions taking place at the rack prices varies by
geography and by firm.
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I. Introduction
The U.S. petroleum industry has undergone substantial restructuring since the mid 1990's.
Among the major industry events were the creation of the Shell-Texaco and Marathon-Ashland
joint ventures, and the BP-Amoco, Exxon-Mobil, BP-ARCO, Chevron-Texaco, and Phillips-
Conoco mergers.  Critics of the industry contend that the increase in concentration from these
transactions has led to higher prices. Some government officials have called for a moratorium on
petroleum mergers.
2  In contrast, the industry contends that these mergers have led to
considerable costs savings.  Before the Exxon-Mobil merger was completed the companies
predicted that they would save $2.8 billion a year in costs. Two years after the merger was
completed Exxon-Mobil stated they had achieved $4.6 billion dollars a year in savings.
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Despite the size of the petroleum industry and the controversy surrounding petroleum
mergers, there have been surprisingly few attempts to examine the effect of mergers on the price
of gasoline.
4  The few papers examining petroleum mergers typically either estimate the effects
of a large number of mergers in a single study, or only examine one level of the industry,
typically wholesale (rack) pricing.
5  The conventional approaches taken to study petroleum     
6Before the changes in gasoline specifications brought about by the Clean Air Act there was
one gasoline specification in the country, now there are 18. Energy Information Administration,
Petroleum Supply Monthly, April 1999.
     
7Also the relationship between these different wholesale prices may change, often in response
to supply outages.  For example, lessee dealer stations, a station owned by a major oil company
leased by an independent marketer, pay a “dealer-tank-wagon” or DTW price which is typically
higher than the posted rack price, but when refineries have supply problems, the DTW price is
often less than the posted rack price.
     
8There are a number of theoretical models that demonstrate how mergers, both horizontal and
vertical mergers may affect upstream (wholesale) but not downstream (retail) prices. For
examples of these types of models see, Ordover et al., (1990) and Froeb et al., (2002).
     
9“Increased concentration in the refining and distribution segment of the industry has
contributed to the exercise of market power by dominant industry actors to the detriment of
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mergers are problematic for two reasons.  First, examining multiple mergers in a single study is a
virtually untenable task.  The creation of boutique fuel specifications to comply with
environmental regulations has Balkanized gasoline distribution in the U.S.
6  Each region of the
U.S. is subject to different idiosyncratic sources of price variation, such as supply outages, input
price fluctuations, seasonal changes in marginal supply and formulation changes.  In order to
ascertain how prices changed as the result of a change in market structure, the researcher must
control for all of these complicating factors.  Second, researchers should be careful about
measuring merger affects by examining wholesale (rack) prices alone.  In any gasoline market,
there are multiple wholesale prices being charged to gasoline retailers, only some of which are
publicly observable.
7  In addition, because petroleum mergers often affect the vertical structure of
a local gasoline market, any given transaction may affect the retail markup a retail outlet earns,
while having little effect on the retail price of gasoline.
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For these reasons, in this study we examine one transaction, the refining and marketing
joint venture of Marathon and Ashland to form Marathon Ashland Petroleum (MAP).  The MAP
transaction proceeded with no antitrust challenge or divestiture.  Testimony by various
participants before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee, on May 2, 2002 suggested that the increased concentration from this merger,
and mergers in general, have led to higher or more volatile gasoline prices in the Midwest.
9  Inconsumers.” and “Although not as large as the mergers referenced above on a national scale, the
most significant transactions in Michigan petroleum markets involve the merger of Marathon and
Ashland Petroleum and then later Marathon Ashland Petroleum’s acquisition of all the Ultramar
Diamond Shamrock assets in the State.” Testimony of the Michigan Attorney General Jennifer
Granholm before  the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee, May 2, 2002.
     
10Competition from stations selling conventional gasoline which did not experience a
wholesale price increase directly across the Ohio River in Indiana or in Kentucky, outside the
RFG area, may also have limited the ability of rack supplied stations to pass thru the wholesale
price increase.
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this paper we examine how the retail and wholesale prices of gasoline in arguably the most
potentially problematic area, Louisville, Kentucky, changed as a result of the joint venture.  We
use the wholesale and retail price of gasoline in a number of cities as controls in estimating
whether the retail or wholesale price of gasoline changed in Louisville as a result of the joint
venture. 
Retail gasoline prices in Louisville do not appear to increase as a result of the joint
venture. These findings are robust when comparing the retail price in Louisville to three control
markets. The wholesale (rack) prices of reformulated gasoline (RFG) increased 3-5 cents per
gallon approximately 15 months after the transaction.  This wholesale price (rack) effect,
however, seem to be the result of a supply shock caused by St. Louis’s switch to RFG rather than
the joint venture. The difference in the retail and wholesale (rack) price changes demonstrates
that it is crucial to examine both retail and wholesale pricing when measuring the price effects of 
a merger affecting gasoline markets.  The finding that the wholesale price increase is not passed
through at retail is somewhat surprising.  In this market, it appears that retailers directly supplied
by refiners, representing 30% of gasoline sales, did not experience a wholesale price increase in
1999.  Apparently those stations facing the higher wholesale (rack price) were not able to pass
through enough of the price increase to affect the average market price because of competition
with stations directly supplied by refiners.
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The paper is organized as follows.  The second section provides industry background and
then describes the structure of the MAP joint venture.  Section three reviews the methodologies
used in merger retrospectives for various industries and those research papers that focus on5
potential price effects of petroleum mergers. The fourth section describes the data used in the
analysis. The fifth and sixth sections discuss the results of the analysis and the interpretation of
the results, and the last section discusses conclusions. 
II. Industry Background and the Marathon/Ashland Transaction
A. Industry Background
Empirical analysis of gasoline pricing in the United States requires some familiarity with
the institutional structure of the gasoline refining and distribution system that affect the pricing of
gasoline.  This section discusses the institutional structure that is of particular relevance for
estimating the price effects of MAP.  There are five main components of retail gasoline prices
(costs):  crude oil acquisition cost, refining costs, distribution and marketing costs, and taxes.
The size and volatility of refining, wholesaling and marketing costs in different regions of the
United States are affected by the myriad of gasoline formulations used in various regions and the
multiple sources of supply to a given region.  In addition to conventional gasoline, other fuel
specifications exist which are designed to reduce emissions and air pollution.  Such
specifications are usually some form of oxygengenated or reformulated gasoline (RFG).  The
federal government has developed specifications for RFG, and there are different specifications
for the North and South and some areas uses a different oxygenate, either MTBE (methyl
tertiary-butyl ether) or ethanol. Some areas have their own formulations to satisfy federal clean
air requirements without using RFG.  These “boutique” gasoline formulations tend to cost less to
produce, on average.  However, in periods of supply disruption, e.g., a refinery outage, it can be
difficult for refiners to ship gasoline to an affected region quickly because alternative supplies of
that region’s specific type of gasoline may not be readily available. 
A city’s source of gasoline supply varies significantly throughout the United States.  The
eastern half of the United States is linked by a network of pipelines and waterways which
connect large refining areas in the Gulf Coast, the upper Midwest and the Northeast. While most
regions of the country receive some of their gasoline from local refineries, the source of marginal
supply varies across the U.S. and may change during the year.  The Gulf Coast of the U.S.     
11The vertical market structure is impacted in a number of states by divorcement regulations,
restrictions on petroleum companies owning gasoline stations. See, Vita (2000) and Blass and
Carlton (2001) for a description, and the estimated economic impact, of divorcement. 
     
12For a more detailed description of the wholesale gasoline markets and DTW and rack
pricing see Borenstein and Shepard (1994).
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(refineries in Texas and Louisiana) produces much more gasoline than it consumes, and ships 
gasoline to the Midwest and East Coast. The eastern region of the U.S. is a net importer of
gasoline, with marginal supply coming from the Gulf via pipeline and from Canada, Europe and
the Caribbean via ports around New York City.  Most of the gasoline consumed in the upper
Midwest, e.g., Illinois or Minnesota, is refined locally, but the region receives marginal supply
from the Gulf.
Not only does the method of supply vary by geography, but vertical integration among
levels of the petroleum industry- crude exploration, refining, wholesaling and marketing- vary by
firm and geography as well. Some firms, such as Exxon-Mobil, are vertically integrated from the
exploration and production of crude oil through refining, wholesaling and marketing. Other
firms, such as Tesoro, concentrate on refining and marketing, and other firms concentrate on
simply refining, such as Koch, or marketing, such as Sheetz or Racetrac.
Further complicating the vertical market structure in the industry, there are also different
vertical relationships between the wholesale and retail levels of the industry.
11  A branded
gasoline station, e.g. Exxon or Shell, may be owned and operated by an oil company (company
op), owned by the oil company and leased to an independent operator (lessee dealer), or owned
and operated by an independent operator (open dealer).  It is important to note that each of these
retail/wholesale vertical relationships results in a potentially different wholesale price.  The
company owned and operated station pays an unobserved transfer price for gasoline, the lessee
dealer typically pays a dealer tank wagon price which can vary by station and which is difficult to
observe, and the open dealer typically pays the rack price plus delivery and possibly a markup to
the delivery firm which is somewhat observable.  The percentage of branded stations of each
vertical type varies dramatically by brand and geography.
12  While this is a very abbreviated
summary of some important facts about the petroleum industry, it serves to outline those factors7
that affect the wholesale and retail price of gasoline.  In particular, given the different
relationships between suppliers and retailers, it is important to understand the vertical structure of
local markets and the pricing at different levels when examining the potential effects of any
consummated merger. 
B. The Marathon-Ashland Joint Venture
The MAP joint venture affected both the wholesale and retail distribution of gasoline in
the Midwest. This was one of the first major transactions in the most recent era of petroleum
mergers and it caused significant changes in concentration.  Many subsequent mergers did not
cause important changes in concentration because of substantial divestitures required by
regulators.  In May of 1997, USX-Marathon and Ashland Inc, announced that they planned to
combine their downstream operations into a refining and marketing company. The joint venture
included 930,000 barrels per day of refining capacity at seven refineries, and 5,400 retail outlets.
The joint venture was owned 62 percent by Marathon and 38 percent by Ashland. The refineries
from Marathon were in Garyville, Louisiana, Robinson, Illinois, Texas City, Texas, and Detroit,
Michigan. The refineries from Ashland were in Catlettsburg, Kentucky, St. Paul, Minnesota, and
Canton, Ohio.
 In addition, Marathon contributed 51 terminals and Ashland contributed 33 terminals.
Marathon contributed 3,980 retail outlets in 17 states and Ashland contributed 1,420 retail outlets
in 11 states. The combined firm has a retail presence in 20 states.  Marathon also contributed
5,000 miles of pipelines to the joint venture (Platt’s Oilgram News, May 16, 1997).  Marathon
and Ashland signed the definitive joint venture agreement in December 1997, and consummated
the joint venture on January 1, 1998.
Marathon and Ashland acknowledged that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was
reviewing the transaction and that they had received a second request for information.  A
Prudential Securities report in October of 1997 stated that Ashland had completed its FTC
document request and anticipated approval in “four to six weeks.”  A December 1997 news story
commented that the FTC had signed off on the merger and did not mandate any divestiture
(Platt’s Oilgram News, December 15, 1997).  The FTC does not usually publicly acknowledge     
13Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Supply Annual,
1997-1998. 
     
14Implicit in this calculation is the assumption that the state of Kentucky is a market.  For the
region we study, Louisville, the number of firms posting a rack price for conventional gasoline
went from eight to seven and for RFG from four to three.
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that it is conducting a particular merger investigation nor does it issue statements about closed
investigations. There were no FTC announcements concerning the MAP joint venture. 
There were three levels of the petroleum industry where anticompetitive effects were
possible as a result of this merger: refining and the wholesale and retail distribution of gasoline in
the area. Five of the joint venture’s refineries were located in the Midwest, and two were located
in the Gulf Coast (where the market was not concentrated).  Gasoline consumed in the Midwest
comes from refineries in the area and from pipelines and barges that shipped gasoline from the
Gulf Coast to the Midwest. While Marathon and Ashland competed throughout the Midwest,
given their respective refinery locations, Ashland had a much larger presence in the eastern and
northwestern portions of the Midwest and Marathon had a larger market presence in the central
portion of Midwest.
At the wholesale level, Marathon or Ashland were among the top four suppliers in nine
states in 1996 and 1997, according to Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration
data. These nine states were Kentucky, Ohio, West Virginia, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan,
Minnesota, South Carolina, and North Dakota.   There was only one state, Kentucky, where both
Marathon and Ashland were among the top four wholesale suppliers. The wholesale HHI, sum of
squared market shares, for Kentucky (the narrowest region for which we can calculate an HHI
with publicly available data) increased by about 800 points from 1477 in 1997 to 2263 in
1998.
13,14
Figure 1 shows the Marathon and Ashland refineries in the central Midwest as well as the
other refineries and pipelines in the area where the largest wholesale overlap occurred. Not
surprisingly, like the wholesale overlaps, the highest retail market shares from the joint venture
were in Kentucky (26%), Ohio (26%) and Indiana (27%). In Indiana almost the entire market
share was from Marathon.  In the other two states, Kentucky and Ohio, the HHI increased by     
15See Figure II for a map of the Louisville MSA and the gasoline station locations. 
     
16We also analyzed conventional gasoline prices at the Louisville rack and at retail in the area
surrounding the RFG area in Louisville relative to the control cities. There was no change in the
price of conventional gasoline at the Louisville rack or in the surrounding retail areas. Figure VII
shows the price of conventional gasoline at the Louisville rack relative the Chicago rack. There is
no change in the price of conventional gasoline. 
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over 250 points to 1500 to 1600 range. These retail market shares are based on sales of gasoline
by brand. Since some of the branded stations are independently owned and could switch brands,
these market shares overstate the concentration. 
Given the concentration measures, both at wholesale and at retail, and the location of the
refineries, Kentucky appears to be the area most likely place to experience an anticompetitive
effect from the MAP joint venture. We are agnostic as to whether the possible anticompetitive
problem may be at the refining, wholesaling or retailing level. 
 Within Kentucky, we concentrate our analysis on Louisville for a number of reasons.
First, it is the largest major metropolitan area in Kentucky.
15  Second, Louisville is directly
between the two refineries (Robinson and Cattletsburg), see Figure 1, and both Marathon and
Ashland had a large retail and wholesale presence. Third, Louisville uses RFG, which makes
arbitrage from nearby regions (that use conventional gasoline) more difficult.
16 In other words,
while in most parts of the Midwest one or the other of the firms had a significant presence pre-
joint venture, Louisville is the place where they most directly overlapped and where each had a
major presence.
III. Literature Review
This section reviews the methodology used in studies that use pre- and post-merger
pricing data to estimate merger effects and the results of papers that examine the effects of
petroleum mergers. While many papers discuss merger effects, there is not a large literature on
the estimated price effects of mergers outside of historically regulated industries, e.g., banking,     
17For a review of the literature on the multitude of methodologies used in examining the
effects of mergers, including those papers that attempt to directly estimate the price effects see,
Pautler (2003).
     
18In addition to the recent working papers discussed in the text, a government report by the
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, 1986) examined gasoline prices from the time period
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health care, and airlines.
17 Most merger event studies that examine product prices before and after
a merger use one of three types of reduced form regressions.
 In the first type of regression (see Barton and Sherman (1984) and Kim and Singal
(1993)), the price of the product affected by the merger is compared to the price of a product that
faces similar demand and cost conditions but is unaffected by the merger.  Specifically, the price
of the product of the merged firm is regressed on the price of the control product(s) and controls
for time or seasonality and a merger dummy variable.  In the second type of regression (see
Schumann et al., (1992) and (1997)), the price of the merged firm’s product (or market price) is
regressed on demand and supply/cost shifters plus a merger dummy.  A third approach combines
elements of both approaches.  In their study of a hospital merger, Vita and Sacher (2001)
examine the price of the merged firm relative to the price of a control group of firms unaffected
by the merger that should be affected by the same demand and supply factors.  They then
regressed these relative prices on relative demand shifters, relative cost shifters, and the merger
event to gauge the effect of the merger. 
  The second approach, which relies completely on demand and supply variables, is
problematic in this case. There are few variables that are available on a weekly or monthly basis
at the city level to help explain wholesale or retail gasoline price variation.  The most promising
approach for gasoline markets is the control city approach with possibly additional variables to
check for marginal supply changes.  These marginal supply changes are likely seasonal, caused
by peak capacity of pipelines or refineries.
One published paper and three recent working papers have estimated merger effects in
gasoline markets by either calculating the actual effect of consummated petroleum mergers on
gasoline prices or simulating the projected price effects from proposed mergers that were not
actually consummated.
18  These papers are representative of the wide range of the methodologiessurrounding Texaco’s purchase of Getty and Chevron’s purchase of Gulf.  Having only limited
post-merger data, GAO did not directly estimate the price effects of the two mergers.  Instead it
estimated a wholesale price- concentration relationship and inferred a price increase resulting
from a change in concentration.  Since the FTC-required divestitures prevented concentration
increases where the merger guidelines thresholds would have been exceeded and because the
correlation between HHI and wholesale price appeared small, the GAO concluded that the two
mergers “would have had only a small effect on wholesale gasoline prices.”  The report
concluded that supply changes other than the mergers were primarily responsible for the
observed increase in prices in 1985.  
     
19 Other research papers have found that company operated stations have, on average, lower
prices than lessee dealers. See Shepard (1993) and Barron and Umbeck (1984).
     
20In the paper there is also a price-concentration regression looking at the relationship between
both vertical and horizontal market structure and the wholesale price of unbranded gasoline in
metropolitan areas in the Western United States.   The authors find that the difference between
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used in merger retrospectives,  single event studies, a cross-section of multiple mergers and
simulations of mergers with estimated parameters.
Hastings (2004) uses an event study methodology to examine how changes in retail
gasoline prices might be attributed to differing vertical contracts and brand affiliations.  This
paper examines the price effects of ARCO’s 1997 long term lease of 260 service stations from
Thrifty, an unbranded and unintegrated retailer; that is, prior to the acquisition Thrifty purchased
 all of its gasoline from refining firms.  ARCO was a major branded marketer which was also
integrated into refining and crude production.  The affected stations were primarily in Los
Angeles and San Diego and increased ARCO’s already considerable retail presence in these
areas.   About two thirds of the Thrifty stations were converted to company-operated ARCO sites
while the others were converted to ARCO lessee-dealer or independently-owned ARCO stations.
Using station level retail prices and controlling for other factors, Hastings finds that gasoline
prices at nearby, competing stations increased  (relative to a control group of stations not having
a nearby Thrifty outlet) by about 5 cents per gallon, after the conversion of the Thirty station to
ARCO. The estimated impact on competitors’ prices did not differ if the rebranded station
became an ARCO company operated station or an ARCO lessee dealer station.
19  
    Hastings and Gilbert (2002) use an event study of the 1997 Tosco/Unocal Transaction to
examine the impact of vertical market structure on gasoline prices.
20  Tosco purchased threeunbranded wholesale gasoline prices and crude prices is positively correlated with a measure of
vertical integration.  The authors point out that a positive statistical correlation between vertical
integration and price should not be interpreted as necessarily demonstrating causality. 
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California refineries along with 1,100 gasoline stations and related terminals and transportation
assets from Unocal. Tosco owned two refineries on the West Coast, one in California and one in
Washington, but had a limited retail presence in California.  Their analysis examines whether
Tosco raised rivals’ costs by increasing the price of unbranded gasoline after it acquired Unocal’s
West Coast assets.  The statistical results show a positive relationship between Tosco’s price of
unbranded gasoline and the increase in vertical integration caused by the purchase of Unocal
assets by Tosco.  The size of the estimated effect depends on the change in vertical integration
caused by the merger.  For example, if in a given city 20 percent of the acquired (Unocal) retail
outlets were within a mile of the an independent (unbranded) competitor, Tosco raised its
unbranded wholesale price in that city by 0.7 cents per gallon. While the paper shows that
Tosco/Unocal raised the wholesale price of unbranded gasoline, the paper does not examine what
happened to retail prices.  Thus, while this paper provides evidence that the change in market
structure affected Tosco’s wholesale prices, it is unclear that consumers were made worse off as
a result of the transaction.  
Chouinard and Perloff (2001) examine gasoline price changes over time and differences
in prices among geographic areas using monthly state-level retail and wholesale (rack) prices for
the period between January 1989 and June 1997. They estimate separate regressions for the
determinants of retail prices and wholesale prices. Their analysis uses a state level fixed-effect
specification. To isolate the effect of horizontal mergers and divestitures, Chouinard and Perloff
include dummy variables for the presence of a refinery or retail merger among their explanatory
variables in their wholesale and retail price regressions.  A merger is assumed to affect state retail
and wholesale prices from the date it is completed to the end of the data set in June 1997.   A
total of 35 mergers were included in the analysis with 27 at the retail level and eight at the
refinery level.  Most mergers yielded statistically insignificant impacts.  Nine of 27 retail mergers
and three of the eight refinery mergers showed a statistically significant retail price effect; only     
21The merger with the largest estimated price increase, 5 cents per gallon in the price of
gasoline, Midway Oil’s purchase of Kerr-McGee Rio Grande Valley, was reported to affect
Arizona when the sale was 10 gasoline stations in Texas. The largest estimated wholesale effect,
a 5.8 cent per gallon increase, was reported for Signal Hill Petroleum’s 1992 purchase of a
Fletcher Oil refinery. This was a 30 thousand barrel per day plant which was closed when Signal
Hill backed out of the purchase. However, the closure of this refinery would likely not have had
this large of an effect on the price of gasoline in California given its small size.
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six of the 27 retail mergers and three of eight refinery mergers showed a statistically significant
price effect on wholesale prices.
Among the mergers that showed a statistically significant price effect, the direction of
estimated price effects were mixed.  Retail mergers and refinery mergers were shown to both
increase and decrease state-level prices.  The same was true for wholesale prices as well: retail
and refinery mergers were associated with both higher and lower wholesale prices. The estimated
average effects are very small, with retail mergers leading to a 0.01 cents per gallon increase in
retail prices and a 0.15 cent per gallon increase in the wholesale price. The overall effect of
wholesale mergers was a 0.11 decrease in the average retail price and a 0.13 cent per gallon
increase in the wholesale price. There were no large national or regional mergers that took place
during the time period analyzed in this paper. While the paper does not list all the mergers that
are considered (35), the four it does list are fairly small and unlikely to have a sizeable effect on
concentration.
21
Manusazak (2002) simulates the effect of oil mergers using a structural oligopoly model
in the petroleum industry that incorporates the divisions between the upstream producers and the
downstream retailers. The downstream, retail, sector is modeled as imperfectly competitive due
to product differentiation primarily based on location. The upstream, wholesale, level of the
model assumes that these firms set prices to maximize profits given the level of competition in
the retail sector.
The model uses data on the retail price and quantity of gasoline along with attributes
about the specific gasoline stations to estimate the demand model and the retail and wholesale
pricing equations. The estimated model’s parameters are used to simulate upstream petroleum
mergers in Hawaii including the 1997 Equilon joint venture that would have combined Texaco14
and Shell marketing assets in the state.  Manuszak finds that there would have been
anticompetitive effects if this joint venture had been completed as originally proposed. In fact,
the FTC required Texaco to divest its Hawaiian assets before allowing the joint venture to
proceed. The author concludes the FTC concerns were warranted but that the dead weight loss
would have been relatively small due to the inelastic demand for gasoline. The simulated price
effect of any two firms on Maui merging was between 2 and 3 cents per gallon. 
Each of these studies has used a slightly different methodology but ultimately all examine
the possible price effects of mergers comparing a pre- and post-merger period either through an
event study or simulation.  The effects found in these studies run the gamut from small price
decreases to sizeable price increases. These studies do point out a number of issues that must be
addressed in a merger retrospective. It is important to examine both wholesale and retail pricing
post merger since the vertical and horizontal competition may have been affected. The event
study, dummy variable approach, without control prices, is problematic because few market-
specific high-frequency supply and demand variables for gasoline are available.   In addition,
examining multiple mergers using a panel data approach can be difficult without carefully
controlling for each region’s supply situation. Given these issues, we focus our attention on a
measuring the price effect of a single petroleum merger affecting one market at both the
wholesale and retail level and compare prices in the affected market with other markets that face
similar supply and demand conditions but should be unaffected by the merger.
IV. Data and Methodology
The goal of this study is to determine how, if at all, prices changed in the Louisville
wholesale and retail gasoline markets as a result of the MAP joint venture.  While it is relatively
straightforward to determine how prices changed following the joint venture, it is much more
difficult to determine how prices changed relative to the “but-for” world where no joint venture
took place.  Specifically, before attributing any price effect to the combination of assets, we must
control for exogenous changes in supply and demand that may have affected price.  The method
we use to control for changes other than the joint venture is to measure gasoline prices in15
Louisville relative to other markets unaffected by the merger facing similar supply and demand
conditions.
Many factors specific to gasoline markets complicate this approach.  First, the
specification of gasoline used in Louisville is different from that used in other nearby markets. 
This factor limits our comparison of Louisville gasoline markets to three regions using RFG
(Chicago, Houston, and stations in the Northern Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C.). 
However, even within these three regions there are differences in the fuel specification.  Second,
the physical distance (and means of supply) between cities causes some cities to be better
controls for the “but-for” world than others.  Third, all gasoline markets are linked at some level. 
Changes in prices, particularly large changes in price, in one market likely manifest themselves
in nearby markets over some time period.  Thus, strictly speaking, it is very difficult to argue that
prices in a control city are completely exogenous from those prices being studied.  Fourth, a
number of factors could potentially complicate the measure of “price” in gasoline markets. 
There are two differences we focus on here: the different quality grades of gasoline (regular and
premium) and the differences in branded and unbranded gasoline pricing.  In the remainder of
this section we describe the various methods we use to examine how the relative price in
Louisville changed following the acquisition.
The Kentucky portion of the Louisville metropolitan area was the only region within a
significant distance using RFG, other than the Kentucky suburbs of Cincinnati which was also
affected by the transaction, in the time period immediately surrounding the joint venture. In the
mid 1990's there was only one other area, Chicago/Milwaukee, in the Midwest that used RFG. 
Gasoline prices in Chicago were arguably the best control price available for this study. 
While Marathon was a small participant in the (very large) Chicago market, Ashland was not
present.  Consequently, Marathon was unlikely to have much ability to significantly affect prices
in Chicago.  Chicago and Louisville faced similar demand  conditions. Because both cities are in
the same region of the country, both face similar demand shocks, e.g., experience similar weather
in a given season.  Both cities also received marginal supply from the Gulf, and both were a
similar distance from the Gulf. Louisville’s conventional gasoline and RFG comes from local
refineries as well as from the Gulf.  Chicago receives conventional gasoline from the Gulf but is     
22While the gasoline differs between the two cities, the distinction between conventional
gasoline and RFG is much greater; that is, RFG made with ethanol is a much closer supply-side
substitute than conventional gasoline.
     
23With the exception of a major barge accident that limited shipments into Louisville for a few
days in August 1999, we are unaware of any shocks to the pipeline that served Chicago or the
barges that served Louisville during our time period.
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self-sufficient in RFG with ethanol production during this period. (Bulow et al. (2003))   Hence,
broad costs shocks should be passed through in a similar manner. Marathon also owned a
refinery (in Robinson, Illinois) that was connected to both Chicago and Louisville via a pipeline. 
Through this pipeline Marathon could have shifted supply from Louisville (where it may have
gained market power following the joint venture) to Chicago where it could have likely sold
excess supply while having little impact on price. 
There were two key drawbacks to using Chicago as a control city.  The first was that
Chicago only used RFG with ethanol.  Louisville used both RFG made with ethanol and MTBE. 
In our data, we were able to consistently observe only the wholesale price for RFG in Louisville
sold with MTBE.  For this reason, our empirical analysis uses the wholesale price of RFG with
MTBE in Louisville.  Thus, comparisons between wholesale gasoline prices in Chicago and
Louisville compared slightly different types of gasoline.
22 The wholesale prices of RFG made
with MTBE and ethanol sold in Louisville appear to have a virtually constant differential (with
one exception) during our time period; that is, the relative price of the two types of RFG in
Louisville do not appear to change over time.  For this reason, we do not believe our results
would change if we had a complete wholesale price series on wholesale RFG made with ethanol.
 
At retail, it was not possible to determine which stations in Louisville sold RFG made with
MTBE or ethanol.  Thus, when examining relative differences in retail prices we compared an
(unknown) mix of ethanol and MTBE RFG prices in Louisville to ethanol prices in Chicago. 
Second, while the marginal supply to both Chicago and Louisville was the Gulf, the method of
shipment was different.  If, for some reason, either the pipeline serving Chicago were out of
service or something affected the shipment of gasoline into Louisville by barge, then the relative
price between the two cities might have diverged.
23     
24Houston and Northern Virginia use the “southern” specification of RFG made with MTBE. 
Louisville and Chicago use the “northern” specification.
     
25  For example, the cities in the Northeast that used RFG, e.g., New York and Boston,
received marginal supplies from Europe or the Caribbean via ports in New York and New Jersey
in addition to the Gulf.  Similarly, areas in California that used RFG have a very different
specification of gasoline.  St. Louis began using RFG June 1, 1999, after the transaction took
place, and cannot be used as a control city in our study.
     
26Efficiencies make take a number of years to be realized. See, e.g., Focarelli and Panetta
(2003).
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The remaining controls were the prices of gasoline in Houston and the Northern Virginia
suburbs of Washington, D.C.  Both of these regions used RFG, although the specification was
somewhat different than that used in Chicago and Louisville.
24  Houston pricing is a good control
since it is located in the center of the Gulf refining region which was a net exporter of gasoline to
the rest of the country.  Thus, the Houston price of gasoline was likely a good measure of the
“spot” price of RFG gasoline in the U.S.  Northern Virginia, while quite distant from Louisville,
had the same marginal source of supply as Louisville.  Neither Houston or Northern Virginia
were affected by the combination of Marathon and Ashland.  The remainder of cities using RFG
in the U.S. in the time period immediately preceding and following the merger faced very
different supply and demand conditions and did not make good control cities.
25
Following similar studies using the event study methodology, we focus on a time period
long enough to allow firms to change their behavior to take advantage of any increased market
power or efficiencies resulting from the joint venture, but short enough that changes in market
conditions unrelated to the joint venture do not swamp the effects we are interested in measuring. 
A priori, we do not know how long firms need to determine how to optimally change their output
and pricing decisions.  One might expect a firm could relatively quickly exploit its market power
following a merger if it understood the structure of demand and supply.  Alternatively, a
significant amount of time may be required for firms involved in complicated refining processes
to begin capturing the benefits of integration.
26  For these reasons, we analyze a fairly narrow
window prior to the joint-venture, January 1, 1998, one year, to measure the pre-joint venture
competitive environment, and examine two years of data following the joint venture.  In the     
27 These shocks were the result of unanticipated refinery outages and difficulty in changing
gasoline specifications.  For this reason, it is difficult to view gasoline pricing in the Midwestern
U.S. (including Louisville and Chicago) as being in equilibrium in 2000 and 2001.  These
problems in the gasoline markets have been well documented.   See, e.g., Bulow et al. (2003).
     
28These wholesale prices are those paid by independently owned gas stations, either branded
(e.g., Exxon or BP) or unbranded (not affiliated with a refiner).  The wholesale price of gasoline
paid by refiner owned stations is not publicly available.
     
29Fleet cards are often used by firms whose employees drive a lot for business purposes, e.g.,
salesman or insurance claims adjusters.  Fleet cards are often used to closely monitor what items
employees charge to the firm, e.g., to ensure that an employee only bills fuel and not food when
visiting a filling station.
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empirical analysis, we calculate price effects separately comparing the pre-joint venture state of
the world to the year directly following the joint venture (1998) and the second year following
the joint venture (1999).  The data used in the analysis this covers the time period from January
1
st, 1997 through December 31, 1999.  We do not examine data more than two years after the
joint venture because of the major supply shocks affecting the price of gasoline in the Midwest in
2000 and 2001.
27 
Our price data comes from the Oil Price Information Service (OPIS).  OPIS collects data
on retail and wholesale prices in a large number of markets in the U.S.  OPIS’s wholesale price
data consists of daily refiner-specific price quotes for different grades of gasoline (regular, mid-
grade, or premium), both branded and unbranded, in roughly 360 markets in the United States.
28  
OPIS also sells retail price data.  The data are generated from a sample of retail outlets that
accept fleet cards.
29  OPIS records the actual transaction price charged at the station on a given
day.  While the gasoline pricing data from OPIS is among the best available, there are two
potentially important issues to recognize when using this data.  First, a price is only recorded for
a specific station, if a purchase is made at that station; that is, if no one with a fleet card
purchases gasoline at a station no price is recorded for that station on that day.  In our data no
single station has a complete time series of prices, and many stations have very few price quotes
(e.g., fewer than one a week).  For this reason, stations that sell more gasoline are more likely to
be sampled on any given day.  We cannot, however, determine how the sample scheme OPIS     
30High frequency quantity data, e.g., daily or weekly, corresponding to gasoline station pricing
data are not available. 
     
31There is no discernable change in the branded/unbranded wholesale gasoline spread
following the joint venture (results not shown, available on request from the authors).
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uses corresponds to a quantity weighted pricing scheme.
30  Second, branded gasoline stations
(which tend to charge higher prices) are more likely to accept fleet cards.  Thus, on any given day
the average price reported by OPIS is likely higher than the (unobserved) average gasoline price
in a market.  For the purposes of this study, however, this should not be a problem because we
are measuring changes in price levels across markets; that is, as long as the differential between
branded and unbranded gasoline does not change as a result of the joint venture, this data should
allow us to determine how the prices change following the joint venture.
31
OPIS sells two types of retail price data (both types are used in this study).  The first type
of data consists of the daily prices by individual stations.  OPIS also creates aggregate measures
of prices for each of more than 360 metropolitan areas throughout the U.S.  While OPIS reports
daily price data, we have chosen to conduct our analysis using data aggregated to the weekly
level.  The composition of stations reporting price data on any day in the OPIS data changes from
day to day.  Thus, using daily data, it is not clear if prices in a market change from day to day
because the composition of the sample changed (e.g., prices increased because a larger
proportion of high priced stations report prices on a given day) or because the price distribution
changed.  By aggregating prices over a longer time period, changes in the composition of the
sample are less of an issue. 
For our two key regions, the Louisville and Chicago areas, we used OPIS’s daily station-
specific retail price data and OPIS’s daily retailer-specific branded and unbranded wholesale
prices.  We constructed the average weekly retail price by taking the average of all station days
reporting in a given week in the city of Louisville (Chicago).  We focused on a region narrower
than the metropolitan area for two reasons.  First, all of our prices are measured before taxes. 
Taxes often vary by jurisdiction, e.g., taxes are different in the city of Chicago than elsewhere in
Cook County, Illinois.  By focusing on a specific jurisdiction, we can correctly measure a
region’s pre-tax price.  Second, within the broad metropolitan area, different gasoline stations     
32Retail margins are calculated as the difference between the average retail price and the
average branded rack price because the OPIS retail price measure systematically overrepresents
branded gasoline stations.  We do not report margins calculated relative to the unbranded rack
price.
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may sell different specifications of gasoline (conventional or reformulated), or, alternatively,
stations located on the periphery of the metropolitan area may sell RFG in competition with
stations selling conventional gasoline.  By focusing on stations in a specific city we can ensure
that the sample stations face the same regulations and are selling the same type of gasoline. 
Wholesale (rack) prices are constructed by taking the average price of gasoline across all firms in
a given week.  Wholesale prices are calculated separately for branded and unbranded gasoline.
The retail and wholesale prices we use for the other control regions, Houston and
Northern Virginia, are the aggregate prices sold by OPIS.  We construct weekly retail prices by
taking the average of the daily OPIS price in a given week.  Similarly, the wholesale prices for
Houston and Northern Virginia are constructed by taking the weekly average of the daily average
branded and unbranded wholesale prices from OPIS.
Because most gasoline sold in the U.S., approximately 80 percent in 2002, is regular
octane gasoline, we focus on the pricing of regular gasoline in this study.  In checking the
robustness of our empirical findings, however, we also examine the price of premium gasoline. 
Because a small proportion of gasoline sold is either premium or mid-grade, OPIS does not
report station specific premium or mid-grade retail gasoline prices.  OPIS does, however,
construct aggregated daily premium retail gasoline prices.  The premium retail gasoline prices
analyzed in this study are all constructed by taking the weekly average of OPIS’s reported daily
prices.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for wholesale and retail gasoline prices for all
of the types of RFG examined in the study.  The table shows that regular gasoline prices (net of
taxes) and retail margins
32 (defined as the difference between retail price and wholesale price) are
highest in Chicago.  Wholesale regular prices and retail prices are the lowest in Houston, which
is consistent with Houston being located in the region that exports gasoline to the rest of the U.S. 
Interestingly, retail margins on regular gasoline are quite similar in the city of Louisville and the     
33For example the price of crude oil, the main input cost to making gasoline, went from near
10 dollars a barrel in 1998 to over 25 dollars a barrel in 1999. 
     
34Because the gasoline stations sampled by OPIS are disproportionately branded, we use
branded wholesale prices for our primary analysis.  As discussed in more detail in this section,
the same qualitative results are found using unbranded prices.
     
35Retail prices are calculated as the average over all stations in either the city of Louisville or
the city of Chicago for a given week.
21
Houston and Northern Virginia metropolitan areas (and much lower than Chicago).  The means
of wholesale prices, retail prices and retail margins are different for premium gasoline. 
Wholesale prices of premium gasoline are more similar across the four cities than regular
gasoline.  The relative retail prices of regular and premium gasoline are significantly different for
Chicago and Louisville, which is likely a result of sample composition (regular retail prices are
the averages for stations in the cities of Chicago and Louisville, while premium prices are the
OPIS reported average over the entire Chicago area and Kentucky portion of the Louisville
metropolitan areas).  
V. Empirical Analysis
We begin by presenting a simple graphical description of how wholesale and retail
gasoline prices (and the implied retail margin) in Louisville changed following the MAP joint
venture.  Because gasoline prices are very volatile both over time and often between regions of
the country, we need to explicitly control for how the relative price of gasoline changed in
Louisville.
33  Figure III presents the difference in the wholesale price for branded gasoline,
34 the
average retail price of gasoline,
35 and the retail margin (wholesale price-retail price) between
Louisville and Chicago; that is, Figure III graphs the Louisville measure minus the Chicago
measure (PLt-PCt).  From Figure III we see that gasoline prices and retail margins were almost
always higher in Chicago than Louisville.  During the 1997-1999 time period, annual average
wholesale prices, retail prices, and retail margins  were about 1.2, 9.3, and 8.1 cents higher in
Chicago than Louisville, respectively.  In addition, the figure shows there were systematic
seasonal differences in gasoline prices between Chicago and Louisville.  Retail prices tended to     
36Retail and wholesale prices for Northern Virginia and Houston are the OPIS calculated
average prices.
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be relatively lower in Louisville at the end of the year, and wholesale prices tended to increase at
the end of the year.  
Following the MAP joint venture (January 1, 1998), there did not appear to be a
systematic change in Louisville’s retail prices relative to Chicago.  Louisville’s relative retail
price appeared to have decreased in late 1998 and early 1999, but returned to 1997 levels by the
end of 1999.  In contrast, Louisville’s wholesale price increased somewhat in 1998 (relative to
1997) and increased substantially roughly 15 months following the creation of MAP, and
appeared to stay at this higher level for the remainder of the time period.  These two findings
suggest that the relative retail margin earned by gas stations in Louisville decreased substantially
following the joint venture (the implied relative margin, (Retail PriceL - Wholesale PriceL) -
(Retail PriceC - Wholesale PriceC) is plotted in Figure III).
To check the robustness of the pattern seen in Figure III, we plotted the wholesale and
retail prices of gasoline in Louisville (and retail margins) relative to the three control regions:
Chicago, Houston, and Northern Virginia.
36  Figure IV shows the difference between Louisville’s
branded wholesale gasoline prices and those of Chicago, Houston, and Northern Virginia in
1997, 1998, and 1999.  While the average differential between Louisville and Houston, Northern
Virginia, and Chicago were clearly different (Chicago has higher prices than Northern Virginia,
which has higher prices than Houston), the changes in the differential overtime were very similar. 
The data clearly show that Louisville’s relative wholesale price increased dramatically roughly
15 months after the merger.  Figure V (for retail prices) and Figure VI (for retail margins)
showed that the pattern for changes in retail prices and retail margins was quite similar when
measured relative to Northern Virginia, Houston, or Chicago.  Specifically, there did not appear
to be any significant change in retail prices, but retail margins fell.  
This pattern can be also be seen in the average annual differentials between Louisville
and the control cities in Table 2.  The mean difference between Louisville’s rack price and
Chicago’s, Houston’s , and Northern Virginia’s rack priced increased by 5.4, 2.7, and 3.5 cents a
gallon, respectively between 1997 and 1999.  Similarly, between 1997 and 1999 relative retail     
37The crude oil futures price used is the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) contract
for crude delivery at Cushing Oklahoma in the next month.
     
38  There are persistent regional difference in seasonal changes in gasoline prices.  For
instance, different regions begin burning “summer” blends of gasoline at different times.
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margins in Louisville fell by about 5.7, 6.7, and 1.2 cents a gallon relative to Houston, Chicago,
and Northern Virginia.  In contrast, there is no systematic change in Louisville’s relative gasoline
prices following the merger.  
Our next step is to determine if the empirical pattern seen in the plots (increased
wholesale prices and decreased retail margins) is robust to controlling for seasonal effects.  We
do this using a simple difference-in-difference estimator.  We assume that Louisville’s retail
prices, rack prices, and retail margins at a point in time are explained by expected crude oil prices
(Ft),
37 changes induced by the joint venture (estimated separately for 1998 and 1999), seasonal
effects (proxied by month dummies, Dmt), and time-specific supply and demand shocks (gt) as
described by equation (1) below.
The prices (margins) in the control cities are explained by a similar relationship described by
equation (2) below (the key difference being no systematic change induced by the joint venture). 
We allow for the possibility that the effect of future crude prices could have different effects on
retail prices (margins) in different cities , and that there may be systematic differences
in seasonal pricing across regions .
38  Our key assumption required to identify the
price changes caused by the joint venture is that the time-specific supply and demand shocks (gt)
are common for Louisville and the control cities.      
39We use the Prais-Winsten correction for autocorrelation.
     
40The wholesale price increase in 1998 is not, however, robust to changes in the measure of
the price of gasoline, see Table 3.  
     
41The data appear to be stationary in the retail price and retail margin regressions.  However,
the error terms in the rack price regressions may be non-stationary.  The autocorrelation
coefficients are very large in these regressions: .98 for Chicago, .90 for Houston, and .86 for
Virginia, and the null hypothesis of non-stationarity cannot be rejected for these regressions. 
Thus, the estimated standard errors must be viewed with caution.  However, the pattern seen
from these regressions is consistent with the figures and average differences shown in Table 2.
24
To estimate the price effects of the joint-venture we take the difference of equations (1)
and (2) and estimate equation (3) below which eliminates the time-specific shocks to price (gt).
Because the error term of equation (3) is autoregressive, we estimate it using an ar(1)
correction.
39  The parameter estimates of equation (3) for retail prices, rack prices, and retail
margins are presented in Tables 3a, 3b, and 3c, respectively.
 The general pattern of results seen in Figures IV, V, and VI is seen in the estimated price
effects for 1998 and 1999.  There is no consistent evidence showing a change in relative retail
prices in Louisville.  Louisville’s retail price is essentially unchanged relative to Chicago, down
two cents in 1999 relative to Houston, but up two cents relative to Northern Virginia.  None of
these price changes are statistically significant at conventional levels.  In contrast, Louisville’s
rack prices may have increased slightly in 1998 (between 1.75 and 3.75 cents) and increased
substantially in 1999 (between 3.25 and 6.75 cents).
40, 41 There is some difference across control
cities in the change in relative retail margins.  Relative to Chicago and Houston, retail margins in
Louisville appear to have fallen about six cents in 1999.  The relative decrease in Houston is
much smaller, about 1.7 cents, and is not significant at conventional levels.  In addition, a cursory
view of the estimated coefficients on the month dummies shows that there are systematic
differences in retail and rack prices overtime across cities; that is, the coefficients on the month
dummies are both economically and statistically significantly different from zero.      
42For example, in gasoline markets branded gasoline (sold through stations affiliated with
major oil companies) typically sells at a premium relative to gasoline sold through unaffiliated
stations (e.g., a local convenience stores).  However, even within the branded gasolines there are
real differences in pricing which make distinctions between branded and unbranded gasoline less
meaningful.  For example, in California, gasoline sold at ARCO stations often sells at a
significant discount below the average price, but ARCO is clearly a “branded” station.
     
43The six firms were Amoco, BP, Chevron, Citgo, Marathon, Shell, and Sunoco.
     
44The three firms were MAP, BP, and S.R. & M.(Sunoco). 
     
45A small amount of gasoline sold, six percent,  is “mid-grade” with an octane rating between
88 and 90, which is a combination of regular and premium gasoline.
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To test the robustness of our findings we examined the prices of two alternative types of
RFG sold in Louisville and the control cities: unbranded gasoline and premium gasoline. 
Because the OPIS retail data oversamples branded gasoline, and because it is difficult to define
exactly what an unbranded gasoline station is,
42 we conduct our primary analysis of wholesale
gasoline pricing using branded gasoline.  However, a priori, there may be reason to believe the
price effects of the merger could differ for branded and unbranded gasolines sold in the
wholesale market.  In Louisville the creation of MAP did not affect the number of firms (six)
typically posting wholesale prices for branded gasoline (Ashland did not sell branded gasoline in
the wholesale market).
43  In contrast, for unbranded gasoline both Marathon and Ashland were
important participants, and following the merger only three firms were typically selling
unbranded RFG in Louisville.
44  Because branded wholesale gasoline typically sells at a premium
of 1-2 cents a gallon relative to unbranded gasoline, following the creation of MAP the
differential between branded and unbranded wholesale prices might converge. 
There is also a differentiation between grades of gasoline based on the octane level of the
gasoline.  Most gasoline sold, 80 percent, is regular unleaded, with an octane rating between 85
and 88.  Most of the remaining gasoline sold, 14 percent, is premium, with an octane rating of
greater than 90.
45  Because there are different price cost margins on premium gasoline, see
Barron et al. (2000), the creation of MAP could have different effects in this market segment.
The changes in relative prices appear to be essentially the same for premium gasoline
(both branded and unbranded) and unbranded regular gasoline as for the base case of regular     
46To facilitate comparison of the results, the estimates from Table 3a, 3b, and 3c are
reproduced in Table 5.
     
47While the estimated year effect for wholesale gasoline in1998 (relative to 1997) is positive
in all of the estimated specifications of equation 2, the year effect is not statistically significant
for unbranded gasoline sold in Houston or Northern Virginia. 
     
48The U.S. Midwest experienced multiple supply shocks in 2000 and 2001 that caused large
movements in gasoline prices both within and between Midwestern cities.  In particular, the
differences between wholesale prices in Louisville and the control cities changed dramatically
and frequently as gasoline markets responded to these supply shocks.  For this reason, it is very
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branded gasoline.  Table 4 presents the estimated year effects from the regression of the
Louisville measure on the control city measure, month dummies, and a futures price for oil which
also corrects for autocorrelation; that is, the analogue to Tables 3a, 3b, and 3c.  For brevity, we
only report the coefficients and corresponding t-statistics for the year dummies. 
46  The patterns
for premium gasoline (both branded and unbranded) and unbranded regular gasoline are the same
as in Tables 3a, 3b, and 3c.  Rack prices for premium gasoline and unleaded gasoline increased
by three to seven cents per gallon in 1999 relative to 1997 (depending on the control city).
47 
Retail prices did not exhibit any systematic price change, and retail margins fell by two to seven
cents per gallon, depending on the choice of control city.
VI. Interpreting the Results
The primary goal of this study is to determine if consumer prices increased as a result of
the MAP joint venture.  Our findings suggest that retail prices did not increase following the joint
venture.  This finding is robust to the choice of control city (Chicago, Louisville, or Northern
Virginia) and grade of gasoline (regular/premium).  We did, however, find a significant increase
in wholesale (rack) prices which occurred roughly 15 months following the joint venture.  This
wholesale price increase is seen for both branded and unbranded gasoline and is robust to the
grade of gasoline sold and choice of control city.  While the wholesale price increase continues to
the end of the sample period (through 1999), it is very difficult to determine if the differential
disappears in 2000 or 2001.
48 (because of supply shocks affecting the Midwest region in 2000difficult to isolate any relatively small(three to five cent per gallon) permanent change in relative
gasoline prices during this time period.
     
49Most of the gasoline consumed in St. Louis and Louisville was made with MTBE rather than
ethanol.  In contrast, all of the RFG consumed in Chicago was made with ethanol and produced
locally by the Chicago area refiners. 
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and 2001).  The primary question is whether the change in wholesale pricing was related to the
merger. A secondary question is why was there no overall change in retail pricing given the
increase in wholesale prices.  This section discusses there two issues.
The increase in relative rack prices in Louisville was not likely the result of the joint
venture.  Instead, rack prices appear to have increased because of a large increase in demand for
the RFG in the Midwest that may not have been completely anticipated by refiners.  This increase
in demand was caused by St. Louis entering the RFG program.
Specifically, in the summer of 1999, the St. Louis MSA began using RFG. Prior to 1999,
the St. Louis area used a low Reid vapor pressure conventional gasoline in an attempt to satisfy
air quality requirements without using RFG. In 1998, after failing to meet federal clean air
requirements and facing the possibility of losing federal highway funds, the Missouri legislature
passed a bill removing the ban on RFG sales in the state and authorized the state to opt into the
federal RFG program. The Missouri Governor then sent a letter to the EPA in the Summer of
1998 asking to opt into the RFG  program. The EPA issued a proposed rule in September of 1998
and a final rule in February of 1999 which required refiners to supply RFG at wholesale by May
1, 1999  and retail by June 1, 1999.  Industry articles suggest that the industry met the May 1 and
June 1 deadlines. (Platt’s Oilgram News, various issues)
There are a number of reasons to argue that St. Louis’s switch to RFG was the source of
the Louisville price spike.  First, when St. Louis began using RFG, it was consuming essentially
the same type of RFG as Louisville.
49 Second, both cities had the same source of marginal
supply, gasoline imported from the Gulf area refineries either by barge or pipeline.  Third, the
increased demand for RFG resulting from St. Louis’s entry into the federal reformulated program
was substantial.  While quantities of gasoline sold are not readily available at the MSA level, the
state level data in this case is useful.  The average monthly amount of RFG sold in Missouri     
50Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Marketing Annual,
1998 and 1998.
     
51In addition, the average amount of RFG sold in Louisville in 1999, 1.08 million gallons a
day, was over 14 percent higher than in 1998, 947.5 thousand gallons a day. While it is not clear
what caused the increased demand in Louisville, it is hard to argue that there was an
anticompetitive effect from this merger with an increase in sales of 14 percent. 
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(which is only consumed in St. Louis) for 1999 was 1.04 million gallons a day while the average
amount of RFG sold in Kentucky (which is only sold in the Louisville area and Kentucky
suburbs of Cincinnati) was 1.08 million gallons a day.
50 Thus, Midwest demand for RFG with
MTBE essentially doubled in the spring/summer of 1999.
51
The timing of Louisville’s relative wholesale price increase for RFG is consistent with St.
Louis entering the reformulated program.  In order to meet the EPA requirement to have RFG
available at wholesale by May 1, 1999, wholesalers in St. Louis would have to begin building
inventories of RFG in late March or early April.  This is when Louisville’s relative RFG prices
began to increase.  Figure VII shows the difference in the rack prices between Louisville and
Chicago for both conventional gasoline and RFG. Not only does this graph show the timing of
the change in RFG pricing in April of 1999 but also shows that the relationship between Chicago
and Louisville in conventional was unchanged during the three years as mentioned earlier. 
In order to double the amount of RFG made with MTBE needed to supply the Midwest,
refiners needed to change their output mix to less conventional gasoline (which had been
consumed in St. Louis) to RFG.  Recent studies, see Bulow et al (2003) and Taylor and Fischer
(2003), suggest that modifying refineries to produce new specifications of gasoline is
complicated and can lead to unexpected output reductions.  For example, a change in the RFG
specifications in 2000 substantially reduced local refining capacity in the upper Midwest that
increased the price of gasoline in the Chicago/Milwaukee area. 
An additional fact consistent with there being a supply shock in Louisville is the change
in the difference between the rack and the DTW prices in 1999. In other markets experiencing
supply disruptions (the Midwest in 2000, California in 1999 and 2000), stations supplied directly
by refiners (DTW stations) experience less of a wholesale price increase than those stations that     
52Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Petroleum Marketing Annual,
1999 and 2000.
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purchase their gasoline in at the rack.
52 Normally the rack price is less than the DTW price
because the rack price does not include delivery or additional services.
The pricing pattern in Louisville in mid to late 1999 is similar to that observed in other
regions experiencing supply disruptions.  A comparison of the rack and DTW prices for RFG
gasoline in Kentucky shows that there was a change in relative prices in 1999.   The difference
between the DTW price and the rack price in Kentucky, shown in Figure VIII, averaged 4-5 cents
per gallon in 1997 and 1998.  In 1999 the difference between DTW and rack prices was
historically low and was negative for a few months. This drop in the DTW-to-rack spread
coincides with the increase in rack prices which began in April 1999.
The change in relative prices between the rack and the DTW prices for reformulated
gasoline at wholesale also suggests an explanation for the lack of pass through between
wholesale and retail prices. The rack price represents the wholesale price for a portion of the
stations in a market that are supplied from the rack. The remainder of the stations are either
lessee dealers which pay the DTW price or the company owned and operated stations which pay
an internal transfer price.  Our findings shows that the rack supplied stations experienced a
relative wholesale price increase for RFG of 3-5 cents per gallon.  In contrast, the differential
between rack and DTW prices decreased by 3-5 cents per gallon (DTW became relatively less
expensive).  These two facts imply that DTW stations experienced virtually no change in relative
wholesale price.  DTW stations make up a significant proportion of the stations in Louisville. 
According to the New Image Marketing survey(s) of the gasoline stations in Louisville, 22
percent of the stations are direct supplied (either DTW or company operated) by a count of the
number of stations. When weighted by the estimated number of gallons sold the direct supplied
stations represent 30 percent of the stations in Louisville.  Thus, rack supplied stations were
competing with DTW and company owned stations (accounting for 30% of sales) that did not
experience an increase in relative wholesale prices.  This certainly inhibited the ability of rack-
supplied stations to pass through their increased wholesale prices. Estimating a model of the
average weekly price of gasoline by station on ownership type, described in the appendix, shows30
that the price of gasoline at rack supplied stations increased from 1998 to 1999 relative to the
direct supplied stations by about 0.5 cents per gallon.   
Additionally, as shown in Figure II, the reformulated area in Louisville is not particularly
large, a little over 20 by 20 miles, and is surrounded on all sides by stations selling conventional
gasoline. Thus stations paying the rack price for gasoline are competing with direct served
stations, which also did not experience the relative wholesale price increase, and are also
competing with stations across the Indiana border and further out in Kentucky that sell
conventional gasoline, which did not experience a relative price increase.  Apparently these
factors kept stations supplied by the rack in Louisville from passing through enough of the price
increase to affect average retail prices.
VII. Conclusions
This study uses retail gasoline prices and wholesale (rack) gasoline prices for Louisville
and a number of control cities to examine the price effects of the Marathon-Ashland joint
venture. We find no effect of this transaction on the retail price of RFG or conventional gasoline
in Louisville. Wholesale (rack) RFG prices increased significantly 15 months after the
transaction. This increase coincided with a major industry event which affected the Midwestern
gasoline area, the introduction of RFG in St. Louis.  The available evidence suggests that St.
Louis’s decision to switch to RFG may have resulted in the increase in Louisville’s rack price for
RFG.  In particular, the demand in the Midwest for RFG made with MTBE (the RFG used in St.
Louis and Louisville but not Chicago) nearly doubled with St. Louis’s entry into the RFG
program.  Further, the inversion in rack and DTW wholesale prices for RFG is consistent what
has been observed in other markets that have experienced supply shocks.
The results of the this study reveal the importance of examining both retail and wholesale
pricing in measuring the competitive effects of mergers.  Had we analyzed rack prices without
examining retail pricing, we would have concluded that the transaction led to higher prices. 
Further, the observation that the rack price increased and did not seem to be passed through by
retailers caused us to do additional research into what shocks would have affected rack but not     
53To our knowledge, no article in the trade press noted a relative increase in Louisville’s rack
price, and no article described how St. Louis’s entry into the RFG program might affect gasoline
pricing in the Midwest.  
31
retail prices.
53  Our results suggest that researchers should be very careful in using rack prices as
a measure of the wholesale price of gasoline, particularly in markets experiencing supply shocks,
e.g., the Midwest or California.  The wholesale price that different types of gasoline retailers
(e.g., DTW or rack-supplied) pay may vary significantly during a supply shock.
The results of this study suggest that this merger in a moderately/highly concentrated
market did not raise consumer prices. Given the large changes in market structure in petroleum
markets, additional research into the competitive effects of mergers would be beneficial. 
Because of the idosyncratic nature of oil markets, e.g. different sources of marginal supply,
different fuel specifications, etc., the results of any one study need to be qualified.  Only when a
sufficient number of merger retrospectives are complete will it be possible to generalize the
results to inform antitrust policy.32
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Appendix - The Impact on Retail Prices of a Rack Price Increase
In this section of the paper we provide some explanation for why the relative rack price
increase Louisville experienced in mid-to-late 1999 did not manifest itself in a significant
increase in retail price.  As described in the industry background section, different gas stations
face different wholesale prices depending on their source of supply.  In particular, aggregate
gasoline pricing data from EIA suggests that during the period in which Louisville experienced a
relative increase in rack prices direct supplied stations did not experience a price increase (see
Figure VIII).  Thus, rack supplied stations were forced to compete with direct supplied stations
that did not have the relative wholesale price increase.  Further, direct supplied stations make up
a significant fraction of gasoline stations in Louisville, roughly one third. If the direct supplied
stations were located close to rack supplied stations and sold similar qualities of gasoline (brands
consumers view as similar), then rack supplied stations may have found it difficult to pass much
of their relative price increase through to consumers.  However, because there is some
differentiation among gas stations (either from location or brand) there would like be some
change in the relative retail prices.  We will examine if, on average, rack-supplied stations retail
prices increased relative to direct supplied stations retail prices during the wholesale price spike,
1999.
In order to measure the effect of being rack supplied or direct supplied on retail price it is
important to control for station specific characteristics such as locational rents.  For example, if
more densely populated areas are more likely to have more company operated stations and these
are directly supplied then on average directly supplied stations will have higher prices. For this
reason we include station-specific fixed effects in our analysis of gas stations retail prices.
 In our empirical analysis we use data from the New Image Marketing gasoline station
surveys, 1996, 1997 and 1999, to determine which gasoline stations were supplied via the rack or
were directly supplied by refiners.  We test to determine if the relative price of gasoline at
stations supplied from the rack increased relative to direct supplied stations using a two part
estimation procedure. First we estimate a retail price as a function of the rack price (the
wholesale price to roughly two-thirds of gasoline stations), week dummies (to control for35
seasonality) and station specific fixed effects (see equation 1 below).  Second, we examine the
average residuals in 1998 and 1999 separately for direct and rack supplied stations to determine
if relative prices changed for direct supplied and rack supplied stations. 
The retail prices used in the regression were the price charged by a given station on a
given day (all observed days are weekdays).  The rack price was the average branded rack price
observed on that day in Louisville.  There were 368 gasoline stations in the sample, 81 were rack
supplied. 
The explanatory variables in equation 1explain 82 percent of the variation in the retail
prices. Figure A-1 shows the average residuals for the direct supplied and the rack supplied
stations. The figure shows that the residuals of rack supplied stations increased relative to direct
supplied stations during the relative spike in Louisville rack prices.
A comparison of the mean residuals by source of station supply (see Table A1 below),
shows that the relative price of rack-supplied stations increased by approximately 0.6 cents per
gallon in 1999 relative to 1998.
Table A1 - Average Residuals by Year and Supply Type
Year -1998 Year - 1999
Rack -0.32
(0.02)
0.38
(0.02)
Direct -0.09
(0.01)
0.04
(0.01)
Difference -0.23*
(0.02)
0.34*
(0.02)Table 1: Descriptive Statistics For Gasoline Prices and Margins 
(Prices exclude all taxes) 
 
Variable Name  City  Branded/Unbranded Weeks Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min  Max 
Premium Retail Margin  Chicago  Branded  155  16.39  3.93  5.25  27.37
Premium Retail Margin  Houston  Branded  155  17.23  3.31  8.85  24.73
Premium Retail Margin  Louisville Branded  155  18.41  4.56  7.13  28.19
Premium Retail Margin  Virginia  Branded  155  15.12  4.41  3.82  23.80
Regular Retail Margin  Chicago  Branded  154  22.92  4.01  12.25 33.47
Regular Retail Margin  Houston  Branded  155  13.19  3.30  6.50  21.81
Regular Retail Margin  Louisville Branded  154  14.84  4.07  3.54  23.97
Regular Retail Margin  Virginia  Branded  155  13.08  4.03  4.09  20.40
Retail Price Premium Gas  Chicago  n/a  155  89.65  10.46  65.66 105.95
Retail Price Premium Gas  Houston  n/a  155  82.98  10.18  63.49 101.21
Retail Price Premium Gas  Louisville n/a  155  89.93  13.11  59.73 113.84
Retail Price Premium Gas  Virginia  n/a  155  85.23  11.77  61.61 102.49
Retail Price Regular Gas  Chicago  n/a  154  86.18  8.97  66.25 99.75
Retail Price Regular Gas  Houston  n/a  155  69.07  9.29  51.28 85.70
Retail Price Regular Gas  Louisville n/a  154  76.85  11.63  49.17 97.17
Retail Price Regular Gas  Virginia  n/a  155  72.24  10.59  50.98 87.78
Rack Price Premium Gas  Chicago  Branded  156  73.35  9.91  50.17 90.11
Rack Price Premium Gas  Houston  Branded  156  65.86  10.30  44.50 84.40
Rack Price Premium Gas  Louisville Branded  156  71.66  12.15  44.96 94.44
Rack Price Premium Gas  Virginia  Branded  156  70.23  10.74  48.83 88.49
Rack Price Premium Gas  Chicago  Unbranded  156  70.51  10.11  46.28 89.02
Rack Price Premium Gas  Houston  Unbranded  156  63.75  11.10  39.84 81.53
Rack Price Premium Gas  Louisville Unbranded  156  70.03  12.25  41.73 93.83
Rack Price Premium Gas  Virginia  Unbranded  156  64.32  11.53  39.15 82.50
Rack Price Regular Gas  Chicago  Branded  156  63.46  10.21  39.69 81.38
Rack Price Regular Gas  Houston  Branded  156  56.00  10.32  34.55 74.47
Rack Price Regular Gas  Louisville Branded  156  62.29  12.19  35.40 84.96
Rack Price Regular Gas  Virginia  Branded  156  59.28  10.77  37.83 77.64
Rack Price Regular Gas  Chicago  Unbranded  156  61.85  10.17  38.15 80.35
Rack Price Regular Gas  Houston  Unbranded  156  55.09  10.96  31.36 73.40
Rack Price Regular Gas  Louisville Unbranded  156  61.58  12.42  33.23 85.57
Rack Price Regular Gas  Virginia  Unbranded  156  57.77  11.08  33.83 76.81Table 2: Mean Differential Between Louisville and Control City By Year 
(Louisville Measure-Control City Measure) 
 
Measure  Control  City 1997 1998 1999 
       
Margin Houston  4.28  1.95  -1.44 
Margin Chicago  -5.24  -7.24  -11.91 
Margin  Northern  Virginia 2.15 2.03 0.97 
Rack  Houston  5.78 4.60 8.49 
Rack Chicago -2.63  -3.67  2.78 
Rack  Northern  Virginia 1.93 1.71 5.40 
Retail Houston 10.07  6.56  6.95 
Retail  Chicago  -7.87 -10.91 -9.21 
Retail  Northern  Virginia 4.08 3.74 6.29 Table 3a: Regression of Difference in Louisville and Control City  
Retail Price on Futures Price and Month Indicators 
 
 Chicago  Chicago  Houston  Houston  Virginia  Virginia 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient  Standard Error
1998 Indicator  0.73 1.40  -1.07  1.48  0.99 1.65 
1999 Indicator  0.10 1.47  -2.51  1.51  2.23 1.88 
January  -0.66 1.24 0.66 1.33  -1.63 1.43 
February  1.42  1.45 2.20 1.55 0.24 1.65 
March  2.14  1.53 3.27 1.63 1.28 1.75 
April  3.36  1.58 3.96 1.68 1.87 1.82 
May  2.66  1.61 4.58 1.72 3.23 1.86 
June  3.27  1.62 5.71 1.73 4.51 1.87 
July  1.45  1.58 4.07 1.68 3.39 1.82 
August  0.83  1.55 2.88 1.66 2.70 1.78 
September  -0.69 1.47 0.91 1.58 0.99 1.66 
October  -0.45 1.32 0.09 1.42  -0.06 1.48 
November  0.13  1.04 0.46 1.13 0.31 1.14 
Futures Price  0.64  0.15 0.46 0.16 0.28 0.18 
Constant  -22.28 3.49 -1.64 3.69 -2.73 4.12 
rho  0.78   0.77  0.82  
            
          
          
Prais-Winsten Autocorrelation Correction       
 Table 3b: Regression of Difference in Louisville and Control City  
Rack Price on Futures Price and Month Indicators 
 
 Chicago  Chicago  Houston  Houston  Virginia  Virginia 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient  Standard Error
1998 Indicator  3.76  1.37 1.73 0.89 1.86 0.81 
1999 Indicator  6.77  2.50 3.26 1.30 4.08 1.05 
January  -3.32 1.19  -1.88  0.75  -2.38 0.69 
February  -3.24 1.16  -2.10  0.82  -2.31 0.78 
March  -2.76 1.13  -1.94  0.86  -1.84 0.82 
April  -1.72 1.09  -0.49  0.89  -0.34 0.86 
May  -1.88 1.04 0.02 0.90 0.04 0.87 
June  -1.46 0.99  -0.13  0.89 0.08 0.87 
July  -0.98 0.92 0.04 0.86 0.10 0.85 
August  -0.59 0.84  -0.14  0.82  -0.25 0.82 
September  -0.51 0.73 0.17 0.75 0.11 0.75 
October  -0.38 0.61  -0.34  0.65  -0.51 0.66 
November  -0.58 0.44  -0.09  0.49  -0.14 0.50 
Futures Price  -0.06 0.09 0.37 0.09 0.31 0.09 
Constant  -1.40 3.14  -1.62  2.06  -4.13 1.94 
rho  0.98   0.90  0.86  
            
          
          
Prais-Winsten Autocorrelation Correction       
 Table 3c: Regression of Difference in Louisville and Control City  
Retail Margin on Futures Price and Month Indicators 
 
 Chicago  Chicago  Houston  Houston  Virginia  Virginia 
 Coefficient  Standard  Error Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient  Standard Error
1998 Indicator  -1.61 1.37  -2.33  1.34  -0.73 1.48 
1999 Indicator  -6.27 1.33  -5.81  1.22  -1.69 1.45 
January  3.11  1.26 2.88 1.30 0.92 1.37 
February  5.08  1.46 4.55 1.50 2.71 1.59 
March  5.49  1.54 5.23 1.56 3.34 1.67 
April  5.38  1.57 3.86 1.57 2.38 1.70 
May  4.83  1.60 3.55 1.61 3.36 1.74 
June  4.78  1.61 4.73 1.61 4.51 1.75 
July  2.32  1.57 2.99 1.57 3.22 1.70 
August  0.79  1.56 1.84 1.57 2.59 1.69 
September  -0.80 1.49  -0.23  1.52 0.51 1.62 
October  -0.81 1.36  -0.31  1.40 0.14 1.47 
November  0.20 1.09  -0.01  1.16  0.16 1.18 
Futures Price  0.28  0.15 0.08 0.15  -0.04 0.16 
Constant  -13.08  3.40 0.41 3.34 1.29 3.70 
rho  0.74   0.69  0.74  
            
          
          
Prais-Winsten Autocorrelation Correction       
 Table 4: Year Effects from Regression of Difference in Louisville and Control City 
Measure on Month Dummies, and Crude Oil Futures Price  
for Branded, Unbranded, Regular and Premium Gasoline  
 
Measure Type of Gasoline Control CityBranded/Unbranded Dummy:1998 T-Stat Dummy:  1999 T-Stat 
Margin  Premium  Gas  Chicago  Branded  -1.63 -1.10 -5.35 -3.61 
Margin  unleaded  gas  Chicago  Branded  -1.61 -1.18 -6.27 -4.70 
Margin  Premium  Gas  Chicago Unbranded  -2.13 -1.36 -7.38 -4.80 
Margin  unleaded  gas  Chicago Unbranded  -1.59 -1.28 -6.69 -6.01 
Margin  Premium  Gas  Houston  Branded  -2.11 -1.37 -6.03 -4.87 
Margin  unleaded  gas  Houston  Branded  -2.32 -1.74 -5.81 -4.75 
Margin  Premium  Gas  Houston Unbranded  -3.26 -2.33 -7.90 -6.35 
Margin  unleaded  gas  Houston Unbranded  -3.23 -2.26 -7.49 -5.70 
Margin  Premium  Gas  Virginia  Branded  -0.30 -0.19 -1.46 -0.99 
Margin  unleaded  gas  Virginia  Branded  -0.73 -0.49 -1.69 -1.16 
Margin  Premium  Gas  Virginia Unbranded  -0.87 -0.56 -2.50 -1.74 
Margin  unleaded  gas  Virginia Unbranded  -0.91 -0.60 -2.35 -1.60 
Rack  Premium  Gas  Chicago Branded  3.42 2.40 6.15 2.36 
Rack  unleaded  gas  Chicago Branded  3.76 2.75 6.77 2.71 
Rack  Premium  Gas  Chicago  Unbranded  3.60 2.07 7.63 3.09 
Rack  unleaded  gas  Chicago  Unbranded  3.27 2.17 6.91 2.61 
Rack  Premium  Gas  Houston Branded  1.71 1.91 3.29 2.53 
Rack  unleaded  gas  Houston Branded  1.73 1.95 3.26 2.52 
Rack  Premium  Gas  Houston  Unbranded  1.75 1.84 4.93 4.37 
Rack  unleaded  gas  Houston  Unbranded  1.53 1.46 4.38 3.03 
Rack  Premium  Gas  Virginia Branded  1.94 2.42 4.35 4.22 
Rack  unleaded  gas  Virginia Branded  1.86 2.31 4.08 3.89 
Rack  Premium  Gas  Virginia  Unbranded  1.92 1.73 5.09 3.41 
Rack  unleaded  gas  Virginia  Unbranded  1.56 1.45 4.38 2.85 
Retail  Premium  Gas  Chicago  Branded  -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 
Retail  unleaded  gas  Chicago Branded  0.73 0.52 0.10 0.07 
Retail  Premium  Gas  Houston  Branded  -0.99 -0.67 -2.75 -1.87 
Retail  unleaded  gas  Houston  Branded  -1.06 -0.72 -2.51 -1.66 
Retail  Premium  Gas  Virginia Branded  1.34 0.80 2.65 1.47 
Retail  unleaded  gas  Virginia Branded  0.99 0.60 2.23 1.19 
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Difference Between Louisville and Control Cities Retail Margin
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Chicago Houston VirginiaFigure VII
Difference Between Louisville and Chicago Unbranded Rack Prices for Conventional and Reformulated 
Gasoline
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Reformulated ConventionalFigure VIII
Difference Between Kentucky Dealer Tank Wagon and Rack Prices(1997-1999)
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DTW-RACKFigure A-1
Difference in Residuals of Retail Prices - Direct and Rack Supplied Stations in Louisville
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